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NO-FAULT PRODUCTS LIABILITYPLAINTIFFS' POINT OF VIEW
MELVIN

I. FRIEDMAN*

N

OW THAT automobile no-fault has been implemented in
some states, a debate is commencing regarding its extension
to other fields, principally products liability and medical malpractice. It seems that the debate has started even before it has been
demonstrated that automobile no-fault has made a positive contribution to our society. In any event, I am of the opinion that no
analogy can or should be drawn between the automobile case and
products liability cases. Moreover, to adopt any of the proposals
that have been made to date would be wholly reactionary and
would nullify the progress made in this country toward greater
manufacturer responsibility stemming from such landmark cases
as MacPherson,' Henningsen" and Greenman.!

One proposal in the products liability field has been made by
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell who is well known as the co-author
of The Keeton-O'Connell (automobile no-fault) Plan. Professor
O'Connell has outlined his proposal with respect to products liability in a recently published book entitled Ending Insult to Injury."
O'Connell argues that many of the problems engendered in
"compensating" the victim of an automobile accident under the
present tort system have equal application in the products liability
field. Payment is often delayed. Proof of fault or defect is difficult.
Proof of pain and suffering is also difficult, and some persons go
uncompensated while others are overcompensated.
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Professor O'Connell presents the possibility of eliminating the
tort system entirely in favor of paying wage loss and medical expenses through social security. He finds this solution politically impracticable because national health insurance, which covers only
medical expenses, already has a price tag that has stalled its implementation. He also rejects a straight no-fault plan covering all
manufacturers irrespective of fault or defect because too many manufacturers would not want this open-ended approach.
Undaunted, O'Connell proposes a scheme of elective no-fault.
The enterprise can choose whether or not it will be covered, and
can even select the specific risk that it wants covered by no-fault!
The enterprise electing no-fault will pay out-of-pocket losses, reduced by payments from collateral sources. This means that the
enterprise will not pay for any losses until other sources-workmen's compensation, social security, the injured persons own health
insurance-are exhausted. The quid pro quo will be the certainty
of some recovery, but will eliminate damages for pain and suffering.
It is submitted that the premises upon which Professor O'Connell's proposal is based are faulty. All of the automobile no-fault
legislation to date has excluded serious injuries and death from
coverage. The typical products liability case involves either serious
injury or death.' Automobile no-fault is a compromise which tends
to get the smaller case out of the courts. The retention of the tort
system for serious injuries reflects, I believe, a public policy to
fully compensate tort victims of an accident resulting in major injuries. Full and fair compensation cannot be obtained without damages for pain and suffering.
Professor O'Connell contends that some victims of accidents
get too much money for pain and suffering because of the generosity of juries. The court in Griffin v. U.S.' addressed the issue of
compensation for pain and suffering directly. In discussing the damage award to be made to a plaintiff who was rendered a quadriplegic after taking polio vaccine, the court stated:
As to pain and suffering and the ability to enjoy life's pleasures
before as after the accident, this Court notes that Mary Jane Griffin cannot leave her home except on rare occasions and that she
50'Connell, incidentally, does not specifically address himself to death cases.
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cannot enjoy, obviously, any of life's pleasures, requiring physical
exertion from any of her paralyzed limbs. She suffers excruciating
physical pain from time to time and is always in danger of being
subjected to that pain. She undergoes the kind of mental suffering
that only a quadriplegic who had lived an active life before her
paralysis can know. She is completely aware, she is completely alert,
she is sensitive to every nuance of both physical and mental anguish. She has become completely dependent on other persons,
even to her bowel and bladder functions. She has become her husband's jailer. She knows these things. She can look forward to
being nothing but these things. The law says that she must be
compensated in money for her damages, for the law knows only
to compensate in money for damages which are really beyond
value.'

In the Griffin case, the court, not a jury, came to the conclusion
that the plaintiff's pain and suffering for the past nine years and for
twenty-eight years in the future would be compensated by payment
of $1,200,000. Under Professor O'Connell's proposal, the Griffin
defendant, if it had elected no-fault, would only pay for the plaintiff's medical expenses. There was no out-of-pocket wage loss in
Griffin because the plaintiff was a wife and mother. Other victims
of product defects would be limited to recovery of medical expenses
if they were not working. Thus, a totally disabled child who had
never worked before would similarly be limited to recovery of his
medical expenses.
Under our tort system, individuals or corporations are held responsible for the damage that they inflict through their fault. Everybody is answerable to the community for the damage inflicted by
fault. Under the present system, a manufacturer is answerable to
the community if he fails to act reasonably. He knows or should
know in making a decision regarding safety that if he fails to act
reasonably he will be held answerable. Under Professor O'Connell's
proposal, the enterprise that opts for no-fault will have no such incentive.
I do not dispute that products liability litigation is sometimes
protracted. It is, however, no more protracted than other types of
litigation such as antitrust and securities litigation. When it is protracted, the delay is often due to recalcitrant defendants or their insurers who want to hang on to their money as long as possible, and
7id. at 36-37.
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not to the difficulty of proving fault or defectiveness. One solution
to undue delay, if it is truly a major concern, would be to implement the Rhode Island procedure of awarding interest to the successful plaintiff from the date suit is commenced.
Professor O'Connell is also concerned that some victims of accidents get nothing at all. This can be due to an infinite variety of
reasons, one of which may simply be that the product was not defective and the manufacturer was not negligent. If so, why should
the manufacturer have to pay?
Frankly, I find shocking the proposal that a manufacturer can
elect what risks he will cover. The election is one-sided. The purchaser or user will not be given a choice. Obviously, only the enterprise that will ultimately pay less will elect to be covered. The incentive that the tort system has in the prevention of accidents will
be lost. This loss, to put it mildly, will be particularly unfortunate
in the field of aviation where the adversary process has played a
major safety role.
I also find Congressman Milford's proposal to impose absolute
liability on the airlines up to a maximum amount inexplicable. It
places the entire burden of aviation accidents on the airlines and
the traveling public. The airlines can, of course, speak for themselves, but the traveling public should not be asked or required, as
they would be under Congressman Milford's proposal, to buy insurance to protect themselves in the event that an airline or a manufacturer is at fault in causing an accident. The airlines and manufacturers have adequate insurance and they have prospered without
arbitrary limits on damage recoveries.
The tort system in this country has its faults, but it is the envy of
the world. It would be truly unfortunate if that system and the
safety of the public were sacrificed by the no-fault plans that have
recently been advanced.

